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by Ronald J. Mann*
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INTRODUCTION

One important task of the federal judiciary is to resolve cases
presenting tensions between national and state governments. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit justly is renowned for its work in this area. 1 One major, if not sensational,
arena in which these tensions surface is in cases presenting issues of

• Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1982, Rice University; J.D.
1985, University of Texas. I want to acknowledge the insightful criticism and comments on
earlier drafts provided by Charles Alan Wright, John Cline, Billy Dyer, Michael Sturley, and
David Dow.
I. See, e.g., H: COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: 1891-1981 CH. VI (1984).
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federal jurisdiction, pursuant to which federal courts allocate power
between the national and state judicial systems.
During the survey period2 the Fifth Circuit published almost one
hundred opinions dealing with substantive issues of federal jurisdiction. 3 Like others before me,4 I have not undertaken in this essay to
discuss all of these cases. Instead, this essay considers only cases that
raise significantly difficult and recurring problems. This judgment, ·
of course, is subjective; my opinion as to importance necessarily
reflects my interests. Thus, I readily recognize that my selection has
left a number of significant federal jurisdiction cases beyond the
scope of this essay. 5 On the other hand, I have not intentionally

2. This essay is limited to published opinions of the Fifth Circuit from June I, 1988 to
May 31, 1989.
3. This number, although large, surely understates the volume of the court's work in
this area. First, like most of the United States Courts of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit disposes
of many cases without publishing an opinion. See 5th Cir. R. 47 .5. I (indicating that opinions
should not be published if they "have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases
on the bases of well-settled principles of law"); id. 47.6 (providing for disposition without
opinion in particularly simple cases). This disposition is common. According to the Fifth
Circuit's records, of the 3,727 cases that were closed during 1989, only 2,129 or 57.IOJo were
disposed of by opinion. Seven hundred forty-two or 19.9% were disposed of by judicial
dispositions without opinion. Eight hundred fifty-six or 23.0% were disposed of by the clerk
without judicial action. See United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Clerk's
Annual Report, Judicial Workload Statistics 4 (July 1988 - June 1989) (copy on file with
Texas Tech Law Review). Disposing of cases without a published opinion is but one of the
many devices the federal appellate judiciary has adopted in response to its burgeoning caseload.
For a thoughtful discussion of the benefits and burdens of such devices, see Feinberg, Unique
Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 297 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Viator, Federal Jurisdiction, Fifth Circuit Survey, 18 TEX. TECH L. REv.
521 (1987).
5. The most notable cases not discussed are Rauscher Pierce Refsnes v. Birenbaum, 860
F.2d 169 (5th Cir. Nov. 1988) (denying appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l)
(1982) to an appeal from an order denying a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration),
and Zurn Industries, Inc. v. Acton Construction Co., 847 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. June 1988)
(reversing a district court's decision to realign parties in a manner that destroyed diversity
jurisdiction).
Further, this essay does not discuss any of the sixteen cases I have found that considered
compliance with the procedural rules governing notices of appeal. That a procedural rule
governing such a relatively trivial formality can generate so much litigation, and lead to the
frustration of so many appeals on a purely procedural basis, is strong evidence that the rule
should be amended. Cf. Davidson v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 857 F.2d 988, 989 (5th
Cir. Aug. 1988) (per curiam) ("It will be scant solace to [the frustrated appellant] that the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is considering
a suggestion that this harsh rule [vid. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)] be changed."). Nor is this
flood of litigation limited to the courts of appeals. In the last two terms alone, the United
States Supreme Court has devoted plenary review to at least five cases regarding notices of
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omitted any nonadmiralty case6 on which the panel did not unanimously agree as to the federal jurisdictional question; I have included
the only en bane case, 7 the only case explicitly creating a conflict
among the federal courts of appeals, 8 and the only case in which the
Supreme Court granted plenary review. 9
The cases I have chosen to discuss fall into three categories.
First, the Fifth Circuit decided five significant cases involving the
grant of jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law . 10 Second,
the Fifth Circuit decided two interesting cases evaluating the circumstances under which a party can remove litigation from a state court
to a national court. 11 Finally, this essay considers four cases regarding
a variety of doctrines - ranging from judicially-based doctrines of
abstention to Congressional provisos such as the Tax Injunction Act 12

appeal. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 109 S. Ct. 987, 103 L. Ed. 2d
146 (1989); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. - - , 108 S. Ct. 2405, 101 L. Ed.
2d 285 (1988); Houston v. Lack, _ _U.S. - - , 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988);
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485
U.S. 265 (1988). The Davidson panel undoubtedly read with disappointment the Supreme
Court's April 25, 1989 order (reported in the June I, 1989 advance sheet of the Supreme
Court Reporter at page clxii) promulgating amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, but leaving this rule untouched.
6. This essay does not discuss any cases dealing solely with the reach of admiralty
subject-matter jurisdiction, a group of issues that have diverged from the issues that now
generally are studied in the field of federal jurisdiction. This causes me to exclude Molett v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 872 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. May), cert. denied, _ _ U.S. - - , 110 S. Ct.
563, 107 L.Ed. 2d 558 (1989) in which the panel disagreed as to whether admiralty jurisdiction
extended to allegations of negligence involving a barge located in navigable waters.
7. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988) (en bane),
cert. denied, _ _ U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 1932, 104 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1989).
8. Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., 850 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988) (per curiam)
(rejecting the analysis of Garvin v. Alumax of South Carolina, Inc., 787 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986)).
9. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 850 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.
July 1988), rev'd, _ _ U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989).
10. Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 864 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. Feb. 1989),
petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3828 (U.S. June 5, 1989) (No. 88-2009); Uncle Ben's Int'!
Div. of Uncle Ben's, Inc. v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. Sept.
1988); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988); Chuska Energy Co. v.
Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc., 854 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988); Griffis v.
Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., 850 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988) (per curiam).
11. NPSA Serv. Corp. v. Independent Am. Sav. Ass'n, 868 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir. Apr.
1989); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. Mar. 1989).
12. Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Quhon, 871 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F:2d 491 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied,
_ _ U.S.--, 109 S. Ct. 1932, 104 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1989); Carrollton-Farmers Branch lndep.
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- pursuant to which federal courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction otherwise available to them.
II.
A.

CASES "ARISING UNDER" FEDERAL LAW

Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co. 13

Leon Griffis was injured while working for Halliburton Services
on the construction of a cement barge. 14 His injury fell within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Louisiana workers' compensation law
(the "Louisiana Act") 15 and the federal Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1984 (the "LHWCA"}. 16 Griffis
chose to receive benefits under the LHWCA rather than the Louisiana
Act.17 Apparently because Halliburton had failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance, Griffis filed suit against Gulf Coast,
the contractor who had employed Halliburton at the time of Griffis'
injury. 18 Gulf Coast contended it was immune from tort liability as
a matter of -state law. 19 Griffis, in turn, contended that section 5(a)
of the LHWCA imposed liability on Gulf Coast. 20
The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on its own motion. 21 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 22 First, the court noted that section

School Dist. v. Johnson & Cravens, 13911, Inc., 858 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. Oct. 1988), modified
on other grounds, 867 F.2d 1517, vacated on other grounds, 889 F.2d 571 (1989) (per curiam);
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 850 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. July 1988),

rev'd, _ _U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989).
13. 850 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. Aug. 1988) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 1090.
15. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1021-1379 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989).
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. 850F.2dat 1090.
18. Id. LHWCA § 4, 33 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. V 1987), generally imposes liability only
on "employers," but provides that "a contractor shall be deemed the employer of a subconfractor's employees if the subcontractor fails to secure the payment of compensation" required
by the LHWCA.
19. 850 F.2d at 1091. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1032 (West 1985) (providing immunity
from tort actions for covered employers without a proviso regarding subcontractors analogous
to the provision in § 4 of the LHWCA discussed supra note 18).
20. 850 F.2d at 1091. See LHWCA § 5(a), 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. V 1987) (providing
that LHWCA remedies are exclusive unless the employer failed to secure payment of the
LHWCA benefits).
21. 850 F.2d at 1091.
22. Id. at 1090.
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S(a) does not in itself create a cause of action. 23 Accordingly, 'any
cause of action claimed by Griffis necessarily would have been ~reated
by state law. 24 Relying on the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Garvin
v. Alumax of South Carolina, Inc., 25 Griffis nevertheless maintained
that Jederal jurisdiction was appropriate in this case. 26 In Garvin,
the Fourth Circuit considered a claim, like· Griffis' claim, brought
by an employee against a remote employer. 27 The employee in Garvin
contended that the LHWCA granted the remote employer no immunity, that the contrary provisions of the South. Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act were preempted, and therefore that the
employer was liable. 28 The Fourth Circuit concluded that federal
jurisdiction was present· because the ''defendant is in its citadel with
all of the protection of the [state statute precluding liability]. The
plaintiff may successfully assault it only from a foundation of some
federally derived right, for he has no right of action under state
law. " 29 The Fifth Circuit squarely rejected the Garvin analysis, and
accepted instead the position of Judge Murnaghan, who had dissented
in Garvin because of his belief that the federal issue was raised only
" 'in anticipation of an affirmative defense.' " 30 The Fifth Circuit
concluded: "The claim in this case rests on negligence principles, a
purely local matter in the absence of federal authority, and therefore
the appropriate forum is a court in the State of Louisiana. " 31
The Fifth Circuit's approach is consistent with the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements regarding the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 32 For example, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers

23. Id. at 1091.
24. See id. at 1092.
25. 787 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
26. See Griffis, 850 F.2d at 1091.
27. Garvin, 787 F.2d at 91 I.
28. See id. at 912.
29. Id. at 913.
30. 850 F.2d at 1092 (quoting Garvin, 787 F.2d at 920 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)).
31. Id.
32. The well-pleaded complaint rule rests jurisdiction on " 'what necessarily appears in
the plaintifrs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything
alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may
interpose.' " Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I, 10
(1983) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). For a general discussion, see
13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566 (2d ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
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Vacation Trust, 33 the Court explained that "a federal court does not
have original jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint presents
a state-law cause of action, but also asserts that federal law deprives
a defendant of a defense he may raise." 34 T_he cause of action
asserted by Griffis, although vague, appears to be one created by
state law. 35 Griffis anticipated that Gulf Coast would interpose a
defense based upon the statutory employer doctrine set forth in the
Louisiana Act. 36 In response to this anticipated defense, Griffis relied
on section 5(a) of the LHWCA, which he contended preempted the
contrary import of the Louisiana statute. 37 Thus, Griffis' case appears
to be one in which the federal issue is raised only as a reply to the
opposing parties' state-law defense. Notwithstanding the opinion of
the Fourth Circuit in Garvin, 38 this type of case generally does not
arise under federal law. 39

33. 463 U.S. I (1983).
34. Id. at 10; see P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1056 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
35. See Griffis, 850 F.2d at 1092.
36. See id. at 1091.
37. See id.
38. Garvin relies heavily on the opinion of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Garvin, 787 F.2d at 913. In Smith, the Supreme
Court held that federal jurisdiction existed over a suit by shareholders to prevent the directors
of a corporation from investing in certain bonds on the theory that the bonds were invalid
because of the unconstitutionality of the authorizing act of Congress. 255 U.S. at 201. The
Supreme Court in Franchise Tax Board explicitly approved the Smith decision, 463 U.S. I, 9
(1983); see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5 (1986), but this
certainly cannot be construed as an abandonment of the well-pleaded complaint rule reaffirmed
in Franchise Tax Board. A fair reading of Merrell Dow indicates that only rarely will a federal
issue transform a cause of action created by state law into a cause of action arising under
federal law. See id. at 814 n.12; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 34, at 1006-07, 1020. The
Fourth Circuit hardly can be faulted for failing to anticipate the reading of Smith set forth
in Merrell Dow. At the time Garvin was decided, the only recent Supreme Court statement
regarding Smith was the explicit approval in Franchise Tax Board. It was only after the Court's
opinion in Merrell Dow that the limited view of Smith discussed above was readily discernible.
39. Any determination that declines to exercise federal jurisdiction over a case in which
an issue of federal statutory law - in this case the preemptive effect of a portion of the
LHWCA - necessarily undermines the interest in uniform interpretation of federal statutes.
It is relevant in this context to note the opinion of one recent writer that this interest is of
less concern in interpretation of the LHWCA than in interpretation of other statutes. See
Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in Intercircuit Conflict
Cases, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1251, 1257-64 (1989).
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Willy v. Coastal Corp. 40

Donald J. Willy was an in-house attorney for a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Coastal Corporation, a large corporation involved
in various aspects of the oil and gas industry. 41 Willy was discharged
in October of 1984. 42 He promptly filed an administrative complaint
with the United States Department of Labor, arguing that this
discharge violated the so-called "whistleblower" provisions found in
a number of federal statutes. 43 After an administrative law judge
made a preliminary ruling against Willy, he commenced this action
in a Texas state court. 44 Willy relied on Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
Hauck, 45 a decision of the Texas Supreme Court recognizing a cause
of action for wrongful discharge when an employee is terminated
because he refuses to violate criminal statutes. 46 Coastal removed the
case to federal court, contending that Willy's complaint arose under
federal law. 47 The district court agreed, denied Willy's motion for
remand, and dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 48
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court first considered
whether the doctrine of Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735 49 sup-

40.

855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
See id. at 1162.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. Apparently the tort action did not focus directly on the whistleblower
provisions, as the administrative claim had, but rather suggested that Willy had been fired for
refusing to violate certain reporting requirements of applicable federal statutes. See id. at 1163.
The distinction is somewhat confusing, because the Fifth Circuit refers in its opinion to the
claim as being based on the whistleblower provisions, even though they apparently are not
strictly applicable. Id. at 1169. For convenience, this essay generally follows the Fifth Circuit
in referring to all of the federal statutes on which Willy relied as "whistleblower" provisions.
45. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
46. See 855 F.2d at 1163.
47. See id. at 1162.
48. See id.
49. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). In Avco, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the
"settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (emphasis in original). Avco
concluded that federal jurisdiction existed over a claim for enforcement of a "no-strike" clause
in a collective bargaining agreement. Although on its face the claim appeared to be a statelaw claim for enforcement of a contract, the Court concluded that the extraordinary preemptive
41.

344

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21 :337

ported jurisdiction. 50 The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor51 had extended the
Avco rule to a state action preempted by certain provisions of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"}. 52 But the
court concluded that the laws upon which Willy relied, and the
legislative history of those statutes, "indicate no intent, manifest or
otherwise, that Avco should apply in this character of case. Thus,
under Taylor, complete federal preemption or displacement cannot
be a basis for removing Willy's case to federal court. " 53
The Fifth Circuit's resolution of this issue is correct. The opinion
of the Supreme Court in Taylor suggests that the Avco doctrine
should be interpreted narrowly. 54 Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit pointed
out, one of the principal bases for the Taylor court's conclusion that
application of the Avco doctrine was appropriate was legislative
history suggesting that Congress intended for actions like the one in
Taylor to be treated in -.. 'a similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 [the statute at issue in Avco].' " 55 Coastal appears to
have proffered no similarly persuasive evidence with regard to the
federal statutes on which Willy relied. 56
The Fifth Circuit then applied the general principles of the wellpleaded complaint rule.57 Willy's complaint set forth a state-created
cause of action (a tort claim for wrongful discharge), into which he
had incorporated a federal element (federal statutory provisions regarding whistleblowers). 58 Coastal argued that jurisdiction existed
because the whistleblower provisions raised a substantial question of
federal law, relying on the statement in Franchise Tax Board that a
case might arise under federal law '' 'where the vindication of a right

force of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982),
caused the case to arise under federal law. 390 U.S. at 560-61. For discussions of the Avco
doctrine, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 34, at 1056-57; 138 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 32, § 3566, at 105-06; see also infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text (discussing
application of the Avco doctrine in another context).
50. 855 F.2d at 1165.
51. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
52. 855 F.2d at 1166.
53. Id.
54. 481 U.S. at 66.
55. 855 F.2d at 1166 (quoting Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65-66 (in turn quoting 120 Cong. Rec.
29,933 (1974) (statement of Senator Williams))).
56. See id. at 1168.
51. Id.
58. See id.
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under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal
law.' " 59 The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded, explaining:
Franchise Tax Board, only held that a case might arise ·under
federal law when a state claim requires resolution of a substantial
question of. federal law . . . . While Merrell Dow held that a
private, federal remedy was a necessary predicate to determining
that the presence of a federal element in a state-created cause of
action resulted in that cause of action being one which arose
under federal law, it did not hold that the presence of any private,
federal remedy would in all instances suffice for that purpose. 60

Having r,ejected a global rule conferring jurisdiction, the Fifth
Circuit offered two alternate bases for concluding that this particular
case did not arise under federal law. 61 First, the federal statutes upon
which Willy relied do not· provide a cause of action in the_ lower
federal courts. 62 They expressly limit the remedy to an administrative
claim, which Willy had pursued. 63 The court noted that the Supreme
Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson 64 had held
that a state-created cause of action arising out of a federal statute
does not. arise under federal law unless a federal statute provides a
private, federal remedy. 6s Because of this express limitation on remedies, the Fifth Circuit declared that it would be inappropriate to
conclude that Willy's complaint arose under federal law:
Just as it would 'flout' congressional intent to allow a federal
court to exercise federal question jurisdiction over a removed
claim for violation of a federal statute that does not provide a
private cause of action, it would equally flout congressional intent
to give the federal court original (and hence removal) jurisdiction

59. Id. at 1167 (quoting Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9).
60. Id. at 1168 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 1169.
62. See id.
63. See id. Here the distinction between the whistleblower provisions and the reporting
provision, mentioned supra note 44, seems to have some relevance. The Fifth Circuit noted
that the whistleblower provisions expressly limit the remedy to administrative relief, but did
not discuss the federal remedies available for violation of the reporting provisions. Id. The
Fifth Circuit apparently assumed that there were no private, federal remedies available for
violations of those provisions.
64. 478 U .s. 804 (1986).
65. The Merrell Dow court stated: "(A] complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute
as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be
no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 'arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' " Id. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982)).
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based on statutes that limit the federal remedy to an administrative
action. 66

The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is a faithful application of Merrell
Dow. The underlying premise of that decision is that federal courts
interpreting the general arising-under jurisdictional grant should give
great weight to the provisions of federal statutes that limit access to
the federal courts. 67 The Fifth Circuit's decision gave due reach to
this premise.
As the second basis for concluding that Willy's complaint did
not arise under federal law, the Fifth Circuit relied on Christianson
v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. 68 In Christianson the Court held
that "a claim supported by alternate theories in the complaint may
not form the basis for section 1338 jurisdiction unless patent law is
essential to each of these theories. " 69 Because each of the Sherman
Act claims in Christianson rested on alternate state and federal
theories, the Court concluded that the claims did not arise under
federal law. 70 Willy's claim also rested on alternate theories: first,
that the discharge was motivated by his attempts to cause compliance
with federal law, and second, that the discharge was motivated by
his attempts to cause compliance with state law. 71 By analogy to
Christianson, then, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Willy's claims
did not arise under federal law. 72
Although Christianson provides the clearest application of this
rule, earlier analyses of section 1331 itself also had indicated that
issues not necessary to a plaintiff's recovery cannot cause a plaintiff's
case to arise under federal law. For example, even before Christian-

66. 855 F.2d at 1169 (citations omitted).
67. See, e.g., Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810.
68. 486 U.S. 800, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988).
69. Id. at--, 108 S. Ct. at 2174, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 826. Because Christianson interpreted
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982), which allocates jurisdiction between various federal courts, as opposed
to § 133 I, which allocates jurisdiction between state and federal courts, it would be plausible
to think that Christianson's analysis is not applicable to a case like Willy interpreting § 1331.
Christianson, however, clearly indicates that the same analysis applies. 486 U.S. at _ _ n.2,
108 S. Ct. at 2173 n.2, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 825 n.2; cf. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (per Brennan, J.) (suggesting that a federal
court's decision whether to proceed in the face of another proceeding involving the same
dispute should be no different if the other proceeding is in state court rather than federal
court).
70. 486 U.S. at _ _ , 108 S. Ct. at 2174, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 826.
71. See Willy, 855 F.2d at 1164.
72. Id. at 1171.
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son, one leading casebook had suggested that an action could arise
under federal law only if a plaintiff "[would] be obliged to establish
both the correctness and the applicability to its case of a proposition
of federal law. " 73 Similarly, Judge Friendly had suggested that a case
would arise under federal law "if the complaint discloses a need for
determining the meaning or application of such a law. " 74 As these
statements indicate, it makes perfect sense to conclude that a case
does not arise under federal law if the pleadings themselves disclose
that the plaintiff could receive all of the relief sought without the
determination in its favor of any issue of federal law.
C.

Uncle Ben's International Division of Uncle Ben's, Inc. v.
Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft75

Hapag-Lloyd agreed to ship certain rice owned by Uncle Ben's
from Houston to various points in Europe. 76 Uncle Ben's sued HapagLloyd in state court in Houston for negligence, contending that the
rice was contaminated before delivery. 77 Hapag-Lloyd removed the
case to federal court, contending that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations imposed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA"). 1s Uncle Ben's argued that the suit had been removed
improperly and should be remanded to state court. 79 The district
court rejected the motion to remand and dismissed the claim as
barred by the COOSA limitations provisions.so
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court's analysis,
implicitly relying on the well-pleaded complaint rule, began by listing
the elements of an action for negligence, one of which was a breach
of the duty of care.s 1 The court then stated that Hapag-Lloyd's duty

73. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, 0. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1983) (quoted in Franchise Tax Board,
463 U.S. at 9) (my emphasis).
74. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
915 (1965) (my emphasis).
75. 855 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
76. See id. at 216.
77. See id.
78. See id. Hapag-Lloyd invoked COOSA § 3(6), 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6) (Supp. V
1987).
79. See Uncle Ben's, 855 F.2d at 216.
80. See id.
81. Id. at 216-17.
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of care was. set by a federal statute, the Harter Act. 82 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the action was removable under 28 U.S.C.
section,1337, "notwithstanding the artful pleading which makes no
reference to federal statutes. " 83
The analysis of the court is subject to serious question. It is
hornbook law that arising-under jurisdiction generally exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint. 84 As the Supreme Court recently has
reaffirmed, this rule "makes the plaintiff the. master of the claim;
he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state
law. " 85 The only exception to this general rule is recognized in Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge ·No. 735. 86 But that rule applies only if "the
pre-emptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' t.hat it 'converts
an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal
claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.' " 87 Nothing
in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit suggests that this type of extraordinarily displacive preemption is a feature of either COG SA or the
Harter Act. 88

82. Id. The Harter Act appears in 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196 (Supp. V 1987). Because
the alleged negligence ·occurred before loading of the cargo, the Harter Act, rather than
COGSA, applied. See COGSA § l(e), 46 U.S,C. app. § 130l(e) (Supp. V 1987).
83. 855 F.2d at 217.
84. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38, at 215-17 (4th
ed. 1983).
85. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see id. at 392 n.7.
86. 390 U.S. 557 (1968); see supra notes 49-.56 and accompanying text; see infra notes
97-112 and accompanying .text.
87. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 65 (1987)).
88. See Uncle Ben's, 855 F.2d at 216-17. The two authorities cited to support the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion do not undermine this point. The first case, Eitmann v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), is a case related
to a collective-bargaining agreement and thus is closely akin to Avco itself. In any event,
Eitmann, which found federal jurisdiction over a claim alleging breach of an employment
agreement asserted to be separate from a collective-bargaining agreement, arguably is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386 (I 987) ..
The second case cited by the Fifth Circuit, Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F.
Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955), predates Avco and thus is relatively weak authority on this point.
Moreover, it does not apply the analysis that would be required to find jurisdiction under
Avco. Crispin suggested removal was proper because such a case falls within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the district courts. Id. at 707. To this extent, its reasoning has been rejected
by Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371-72 (1959). See 14
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3674 (2d ed. 1985).
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Richardson v. United Steelworkers of America89

Altheus Richardson was employed by the Phelps Dodge Copper
Refinery in El Paso. 90 The· United Steelworkers (the "Union") was
the collective bargaining representative at the refinery. 91 While Richardson was on strike, his employer permanently replaced him. 92
He filed a suit in state court contending that the Union had breached
its duty as his b:argaining agent by failing to warn him that the
employer had a statutory right to replace him. 93 The Union removed
the case to federal court. 94 Although Richardson's pleadings did not
explicitly mention any provision of federal law, the federal district
court nevertheless concluded that it had jurisdiction and dismissed
the case as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 95
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. First, it noted that Richardson's complaint contained no element of federal law, a circumstance generally sufficient to preclude subject-matter jurisdiction in
a federal district court. 96 The Fifth Circuit then considered applicability of the Avco doctrine. 97 The Fifth Circuit observed one obvious
distinction between Avco and the Richardson case. Avco involved a
suit directly under section 301 for interpretation of a provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement. 98 Richardson, by contrast, involved
a suit alleging a violation by a union of its duty as representative. 99
Thus, although this case did not directly involve interpretation of a
collective-bargaining agreement, it did involve evaluation of the duty
a representative under such an agreement has to the employees. 100
The leading case regarding the nature of that duty is the Supreme
Court's 1967 opinion in Vaca v. Sipes, 101 which held that the duty
of fair representation imposed on a collective-bargaining agent is

89.
June 5,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

864 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. Feb. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3828 (U.S.
1989) (No. 88-2009).
See id. at 1164.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1168.
Id.; see supra note 49.
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 559-60 (1968).
See Richardson, 864 F.2d at 1167.
See id. at 1167-68.
386 U .s. 171 (I 967).
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exclusively a matter of federal law .102 As the Fifth Circuit understood
Vaca, it implicitly concluded that "the NLRA duty of fair representation . . . completely preempts state law because of congressional
intent that federal law, developed to further the goals of the NLRA,
entirely govern the duties which an NLRA collective bargaining
representative owes, by virtue of its position as such, to the workers
it represents in that capacity." 103 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
concluded: "We cannot conceive that Congress intended complete
displacive preemption of the Avco variety in the section 301 context,
but not in the context of the duty of fair representation arising from
a union's status as an exclusive collective bargaining agent under the
NLRA." 104
In light of the strong congressional intent that matters related
to collective-bargaining agreements be determined exclusively under
federal law, as set forth in the Supreme Court's decisions in Avco
and Taylor, the Fifth Circuit's decision is eminently reasonable. The
most serious question is posed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil/iams. 105 In Caterpillar, the Court considered
a claim by an employee suing on the basis of a state-law employment
contract. 106 In light of the employer's contention that the contract
was no longer valid because it had been merged into a collectivebargaining agreement, interpretation of the collective-bargaining
agreement apparently was necessary to resolution of the case. 107 But
the Court nevertheless concluded that jurisdiction was not present,
holding that Avco does not apply to all cases involving collectivebargaining agreements. 108 The Court explained that "a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal
rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract
rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collectivebargaining agreement." 1()9 The difference between Caterpillar and
Avco was that

102.
103.
104.
105.
but not
106.
101.
108.
109.

Id. at 177.
Richardson, 864 F.2d at I 169.
Id. at 1169-70.
482 U.S. 386 (1987). Caterpillar was cited twice by the Fifth Circuit in Richardson,
substantially discussed. See 864 F .2d at 1168, 1169 n.8.
482 U.S. at 388.
See id.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 396 ·(emphasis in original).
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[w]hen a plaintiff invokes a right created by a collective-bargaining
agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead what we have held
must be regarded as a federal claim, and removal is at the
defendant's option. But a defendant cannot, merely by injecting
a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a
state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal
law. 110

It would not have been implausible for the court to have extended
the Caterpillar principle to the facts of Richardson, especially in light
of the strong emphasis in the Taylor opinion, issued during the same
Term as Caterpillar, on the narrow reach of Avco. But there are
pragmatic reasons to support the Fifth Circuit's approach. Caterpillar
was likely to turn on issues of state contract law regarding merger
of contracts and interpretation of agreements, issues generally applicable to contracts other than collective-bargaining agreements; it is
not ineluctably necessary that federal principles displace state consideration of these problems. By contrast, Richardson presents a case
in which the plaintiff cannot prevail without evaluation of the exclusively federal duty a union has to employees under a · collectivebargaining agreement. 111 Under these circumstances, it makes sense
to apply the Avco rule and allow federal jurisdiction. 112
E.

Chuska Energy Co. v. Mobil Exploration & Producing North
America, Inc. 113

The Navajo Indians agreed to grant Chuska the exclusive right
to extract minerals from certain land. 114 Pursuant to applicable federal
regulations, the agreement was approved by the Department of the
Interior and by the chairman of the Navajos. 115 Chuska assigned

110. Id. at 399 (emphasis in original).
ll I. Cf. supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (suggesting that in certain circumstances
federal jurisdiction may depend on whether or not the federal issues necessarily must be
decided in order for the plaintiff to prevail). This concept gains support from the quotation
in Caterpillar of the Court's statement earlier in the Term that section 301 also governs claims
" 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " 482 U.S. at 394
(quoting Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987)).
112. It is worth noting that, as this essay went to press, the Supreme Court called for the
views of the Solicitor General with respect to this case. -.-U.S.--, 110 S. Ct. 41, _ _
L. Ed. 2d _ _(1989).
ll3. 854 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988).
114. See id. at 729.
115. See id.
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some of its rights under the agreement to Mobil. 116 Subsequently
Chuska sued Mobil in a state court in Texas for breach of the
assignment. 111 Mobil argued that it was not liable because the allegations of breach rested on provisions of the agreement that had
been modified without the approval of the Department of the Interior . 118 Based upon this federal requirement, Mobil removed the case
to federal court. 119 The district court concluded that it had. jurisdiction
and entered judgment in favor of Mobil. 120 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the district court had no jurisdiction, reversed
the judgment of the district court, and ordered the case remanded
to state court.
The Fifth Circuit first analyzed the case under the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 121 Chuska's cause of action was for breach of contract, an action created by state law . 122 Federal law enters the picture
only by Mobil's defense. 123 As the court made clear, this is a classic
case in which federal jurisdiction is not present:
State courts are routinely required to adjudicate suits in which
there are related issues requiring the construction of federal statutes and the Constitution .... Mobil may find some reassurances
in Judge Hutcheson's response to an assertion that a valuable
federal right would be jeopardized if a case was remanded to
state court: "As I understand the jurisprudence of Texas, it
operates with an eye to justice, just the same as that of the federal
court." 124

The Fifth Circuit then considered Mobil's argument that preemption under A vco 125 justified federal jurisdiction. 126 The two applicable federal statutes provide that "[n]o lease ... from any Indian
nation shall be of any validity unless made by treaty or convention," 121 and that "[a]ll operators under any ... mineral lease issued

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 730. For a discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see supra note 32.
See id. at 730.
See id.
Id. (quoting Pabst v. Roxana Petroleum Co., 30 F.2d 953, 954 (S.D. Tex. 1929)).
See supra note 49.
854 F.2d at 730.
25 u.s.c. § 177 (1982).
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pursuant to the terms of . . . this . . . Act affecting restricted Indian
lands shall be subject to the rules . . . promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior." 128 Th.e Fifth Circuit had no difficulty in concluding
that these statutes are not sufficient to invoke the Avco doctrine:
Mobil's defense that the contract is illegal under the [federal
statute]. can be raised in state court; it supplements rather than
conflicts with state-created rights. No express provision in the Act
mandates removal of these cases, nor is the regulatory scheme of
the Act so pervasive that it preempts all power of the state courts
to adjudicate cases in which the Act is potentially implicated. 129 ·

This case presents a relatively straightforward applicaton of the
well-pleaded complaint rule and the Avco exception, belying the idea
that all cases involving these issues are complex and unclear.

III.

REMOVAL

The all too common failure of financial institutions in Texas
produced two significant Fifth Circuit cases during the survey period
that explore the boundaries of the power of federal courts to exercise
their removal jurisdiction.
A.

Beighley v. FDIC 130

Moncor Bank made a number of loans to the Beighleys. 131
Repayment of one of these loans was secured by a mortgage covering
certain real property in New Mexico and Texas. 132 When the loan
matured, the Beighleys were unable to pay. 133 They attempted to
repay the loan by selling the property to a third party, who hoped
to obtain a substitute loan from the bank. 134 Apparently because of
its deteriorating financial condition, the bank was unable to make
the new loan. 135 A week later, the Beighleys sued the bank in Texas
state court, contending that the bank had breached a contract to
make the new loan. 136 Approximately three hours later, the bank was

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. § 396d.

Chuska Energy, 854 F.2d at 731.
868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. Mar. 1989).
See id. at 777.
See id. at 778.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 779.
See id. at 778.
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declared insolvent, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(the "FDIC") became its receiver. 137 The FDIC never was served
with the state-court petition, and subsequently a default judgment
was entered against the bank. 138
Approximately one month after the default judgment was entered, the FDIC substituted itself as a party into the lawsuit and
filed a motion seeking a new trial. 139 Before the state court ruled on
these motions, the FDIC removed the case to federal court. 140 The
Beighleys contended that the removal was untimely. 141 The federal
district court upheld its jurisdiction and eventually entered summary
judgment in favor of the FDIC. 142 In affirming the district court and
upholding its jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit rejected three claims: that
its jurisdiction was barred by the derivative jurisdiction rule; that
federal district courts could not overturn default judgments after
removal; and that the FDIC had waived its right to remove. 143
The derivative jurisdiction rule formerly provided that no case
could be removed to federal court if the state court in which it was
pending had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 144 The Beighleys boldly
contended that the state court had no jurisdiction over the case at
the time the default judgment was entered because the Beighleys had
not served process on the FDIC. 145 The Fifth Circuit easily rejected
this argument, relying on the rule that the proper time for determining
if a state court had jurisdiction was the time of removal. 146 At the
time of removal, the state court had acquired jurisdiction by the
FDIC's voluntary submission to the state court's procedures. 147

137. See id. at 779.
138. See id. Although the federal district judge subsequently rejected the FDIC's claims
that the Beighleys practiced a fraud on the state court, the Beighleys apparently knew of the
FDIC's involvement, deliberately did not inform the FDIC of the state-court litigation, and
deliberately did not inform the state court of the FDIC's involvement. See id. at 779 n.5.
139. See id. at 779.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 780.
143. See id. at 780-82.
144. E.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). This
rather senseless rule has been repealed by 28 U.S.C. § 144l(e) (Supp. IV 1986) with respect
to cases filed in state court after June 19, 1986. For criticism of the old rule, see, e.g., 14A
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3721, at 195-200 (2d ed. 1985).
145. See Beighley, 868 F.2d at 780.
146. See id.; 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3721, at 209.
147. See Beighley, 868 F.2d at 781.
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Relying on the aged precedent of Barrow v. Hunton, 148 the
Beighleys then contended that a district court could not acquire
removal jurisdiction in a case seeking only to set aside a state court
default judgment. 149 In Barrow, the Supreme Court explained that a
party could not remove a suit seeking to set aside the judgment in
a prior case if the second suit was "a supplementary proceeding so
connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and
substantially a continuation of it." 150 The Fifth Circuit found this
rule inapplicable for the simple reason that the case in question was
not a supplementary proceeding connected with some earlier proceeding, but instead was an initial proceeding resulting in a default
judgment. 151
The Beighley's final, and most substantial, argument was that
the FDIC had waived its right to remove by filing a motion for new
trial in the state court. 152 The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention,
explaining that a ''waiver of the right of removal must be clear and
unequivocal. ... The FDIC cannot be said to have waived its statutory right to removal simply by taking preliminary steps in state
court to set aside a default judgment. " 153 Although it is a broad
statement to suggest that such a waiver must be "clear and unequivocal,'' 154 the court reached a sensible conclusion on the facts of this
case. The mere filing of a motion for new trial in this case (a motion
that appears not to have received any substantive judicial attention
before removal occurred) did not require the state courts to commit
any significant resources to resolving the controversy, nor did it
impose an undue expense or delay on the Beighleys. Also, in light
of the general turmoil the FDIC faces in these situations, it may be

148. 99 U.S. 80 (1879).
149. See Beighley, 868 F.2d at 781.
150. 99 U.S. at 82. This is but one aspect of a general rule that "proceedings ancillary to
an action pending in state court cannot be removed, since it would be wasteful to have a
satellite element pending in federal court when the principal claim is being litigated in state
court." 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3721, at 202. For a general
discussion, see id. at 202-05.
151. 868 F.2d at 781.
152. See id. at 782.
153. Id.
154. Cf. 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3271, at 223-25 (concluding
that "substantial defensive action" will waive a right to remove). One prominent casebook
has questioned whether it is sensible for federal courts to formulate necessarily subjective rules
regarding waiver, in light of the clear and complete cutoff provided by the statute after thirty
days. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 34, at 1777.

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

356

[Vol. 21:337

that the FDIC is entitled to more leeway th~n the ordinary litigant. 155
Particularly in this case, where the Beighleys appear to have kept
the FDIC in the dark as long as possible, it hardly would have been
fair permahentiy to remit the FDIC to state court because it filed a
motion for new trial.
B.

NPSA Service Corp. v. Independent American Savings
Association 156

In 1985, NPSA Service Corporation Association borrowed
money from Independent American Savings Association (' 'IASA' '). 157
Its obligation to repay the money was secured by a mortgage
encumbering several shopping centers. 158 In 1987, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board appointed FSLIC as a receiver for IASA. 159 FSLIC
transferred substantially all of the assets and liabilities of IASA to
a new entity of the same name ("New IASA"). 160 In the fall of
1987, New IASA posted the shopping centers for foreclosure. 161
NPSA filed an action in state court against New IASA and other
individuals, but not against IASA or FSLIC. 162 Relying on 12
U .S.C., section 1730(k)(l), 163 New IASA removed the case to federal

155. Such a rule to some extent would explain the relatively extreme result reached in
FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors, 459 F. Supp. 880 (D. Wis. 1978), in which removal was
permitted even after the defendant had participated in oral argument in the state supreme
court and, after remand, filed a motion for summary judgment and a counterclaim. See id.
at 882.
156. 868 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989).
157. See id. at 1416.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. The opinion states that both the posting and the foreclosure sale itself took
place on October 6. Id. This seems unlikely, in light of TEX. PROP. CoDE ANN. § 51.002
(Vernon 1984), which requires the posting to take place at least twenty-one days before the
sale.
162. See NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1417.
163. The text of § I 730(k)(l) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, (a) the Corporation [i.e., FSLIC) shall
be deemed to be an agency of the United States within the meaning of section 451
of Title 28; (b) any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation shall
be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the
United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard
to the amount in controversy; and. (c) the Corporation may, without bond or
security, remove any such action, suit, or proc.eeding from a state court to the
United States district ... following any procedure for removal now or hereafter in
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court. 164 NPSA contested removal because neither FSLIC nor !ASA
was a party to the case. 165 The district court refused to remand,
dismissed NPSA's claims, and granted an injunction requested by
New IASA. 166 While an appeal by NPSA to the Fifth Circuit was
pending, New !ASA itself went into FSLIC receivership and its
assets were transferred to Sunbelt Savings. 167
·
When the Fifth Circuit approached the case, Sunbelt and FSLIC
agreed with NPSA's contention that the district court had no jurisdiction at the time of removal, because neither FSLIC nor IASA had
been a party at that time. 168 The only savings and loan that was a
party at the time of removal, New IASA, was not then under FSLIC
control. 169 The Fifth Circuit accepted this concession, relying on an
earlier case indicating that jurisdiction under section 1730(k)(l) applies only to suits " 'brought against the FSLIC or an institution in
receivership. with the FSLIC.' " 170
The parties disagreed, however, as to whether the subsequent
receivership of New IASA was sufficient to grant the federal district
court some type of nunc pro tune jurisdiction over the case. 171 The
Fifth Circuit firmly rejected any such suggestion. The court recognized the general rule as follows:

effect: Provided, that any action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation is a
party in its capacity as conservator, receiver, or other legal custodian of an insured
state-chartered institution and which involves only the rights or obligations of
investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution under state law shall not be
deemed to arise under the laws of the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(l) (1988).
The demise of FSLIC upon the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (103 Stat.) 183, has made the details of these provisions largely irrelevant. See, e.g.,
Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Serv. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing
the jurisdictional provisions of FIRREA).
164. See NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1417.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. 868 F.2d at 1417 (quoting Henry v. Independent Am. Sav. Ass'n, 857 F.2d 995, 99899 (5th Cir. Sept. 1988)). Coincidentally, Henry also involved IASA, and was written by Judge
Higginbotham, the same judge who wrote the Fifth Circuit's opinion in NPSA. 857 F.2d at
996. Strangely enough, he indicated in NPSA that the quoted portion of Henry was from his
special concurrence, although it quite clearly appeared in the portion of the case that he wrote
for the entire panel. Id. at 998.
171. See NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1417.
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"[T]he right of removal is determined by the pleadings as they
stand when the petition for removal is filed." This rule has its
roots in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides: "If
at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court
shall remand the case . . . '' By referring to how the case was
removed, rather than to the court's subsequent jurisdiction, the
remand statute clearly directs attention to the time when the
removal petition was filed. 172

The court noted an exception to this rule that allows a federal
district court to proceed with certain cases even though the court
had been without jurisdiction when the case first was removed, but
the Fifth Circuit refused to apply any such exception in NPSA . 173
The court offered two reasons for its conclusion. First, it noted that
in this case jurisdiction did not develop at any time during the district
court proceedings, but only during the pendency of appellate proceedings.174 Thus, unlike earlier cases, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction at the time it reached its decision. 175 Second, the court
noted that the plaintiff never accepted federal jurisdiction throughout
the proceedings. 176 This latter reason is particularly persuasive. If any
weight is to be given to the statutory direction that jurisdiction is to
be determined as of the time of removal, then a plaintiff who at all
times contests the authority of the federal court should be entitled
to adjudication of his contention. 177 If the appellate court considers

172. Id. at 1418 (citations omitted; emphasis in original; ellipsis in original) (quoting Smith
v. City of Picayune, 795 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1986), and 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982)); see
14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3721.
173. Id. at 1418; see Smith v. City of Picayune, 795 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 1986)
(establishing the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent in reliance on American Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 6-17 (1951)); see 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, §
3739, at 578-80.
174. See NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1418.
175. See id. This justification is questionable. If anything, the federal courts have a stronger
interest in retaining a case if they proceed further with the case before the issue is determined.
Moreover, the language of§ 1447(c) suggests that only a "final" judgment can cut off a right
to seek remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). Although the concept of finality has a
different import in other sections of the Judicial Code (such as § 1257 and § 1291), finality
under § 1447(c) completely destroys the right to challenge jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, I
would think that a district court's judgment in this context would not be "final" while the
defendant can appeal it.
176. NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1418.
177. As the Fifth Circuit noted, the cases on which the exception rested involved removing
defendants who changed their minds about federal jurisdiction after they lost. Id. The
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the claim meritorious, it should remand the case to state court. It
certainly is true, because the case had become properly removable,
that "NPSA's victory ... may prove fleeting," 178 but fair interpretation of section 1447(c) does seem to require that result.
IV.

ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTES AND ABSTENTION

The final part of this essay deals with four cases considering
statutory and judicial doctrines directing federal courts to refrain
from exercising jurisdiction otherwise available to them.
A.

Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Jackson 179

Leroy Jackson worked for Gulfport Shipbuilding Company on
a barge located in navigable waters. 180 After he suffered a back
injury, he filed a claim for disability benefits under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA"). 181 His
employer's insurance carrier, Texas Employers' Insurance Association
("TEIA"), disputed Jackson's claim, but nonetheless paid the claim
after it was accepted by the administrative law judge. 182 While the
case was pending before the administrative law judge (that is, before
TEIA had paid the claim), Jackson sued TEIA in a Texas state court
seeking damages for the mental anguish and stress inflicted by TEIA's
decision to dispute his claim. 183 TEIA contended that the state-court
action was preempted by the LHWCA and thus should be dismissed.184 After the state court rejected this claim, extensive discovery
proceeded. 185

characterization of this as a rule "estopping" a removing defendant, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 34, at 1786-88; 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3739, at 578;
id. at 48 (Supp. 1989), strongly supports the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the exception
should not deprive plaintiffs who file in state court of their opportunity to contest federal
jurisdiction. See also Mackay v. Uinta Dev. Co., 229 U.S. 173, 177 (1913) (accepting jurisdiction
over removal of a nonremovable case after "voluntary attendance" of plaintiff in federal
court).
178. NPSA, 868 F.2d at 1419.
179. 862 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. Dec. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, __ U.S. _ _ , 109 S. Ct.
1932, 104 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1989).
180. See id. at 494.
181. See id. The LHWCA appears at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
182. See TE/A, 862 F.2d at 494.
183. See id. at 495.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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A few months before trial was scheduled, TEIA filed suit against
Jackson in federal court seeking an injunction against further prosecution of the state-court action and a declaratory judgment that the
claim raised in the state-court action was preempted by the LHWCA. 186
The district court issued a permanent injunction. 187 On appeal, a
divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part, concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act 188 barred issuance of
an injunction, but that declaratory relief nonetheless was available. 189
On the merits, the panel concluded that the LHWCA preeempted
Jackson's claims. 190 The Fifth Circuit granted en bane review and
reversed the district court's judgment, concluding that the AntiInjunction Act barred issuance either of an injunction or of a
declaratory judgment.
The analysis of Judge Garwood's lengthy and scholarly opinion
began by considering the availability of injunctive relief. 191 After a

186. See id. at 493.
187. 618 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
188. That statute provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U .S.C. §
2283 (1982).
189. 820 F.2d 1406, 1415 (5th Cir. 1987).
190. Id. at 1417-18.
191. The court noted that the panel had concluded the district court had jurisdiction over
the case under the rule of Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968),
notwithstanding the narrowing of Avco by Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987). For a brief discussion of Avco, see supra note 49. The en bane court found it
unnecessary to its resolution of the case to consider whether the district court had jurisdiction,
because it concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act in any event prohibited exercise by the
district court of that authority. 862 F.2d at 496 n.8. Although this practice of assuming the
existence of jurisdiction may seem quite odd to the purist, it does, as Judge Garwood noted,
resemble the action taken by the Supreme Court in Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S.
676 (1974) (per curiam) (skipping over a jurisdictional issue to deny relief on the merits). See
also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., _ _ U.S.--,--, 110 S. Ct. 661, 66567, _ _ L. Ed. 2d - - , _ _ (1990) (declining to decide whether a plaintiff had standing
to bring an action and instead dismissing the action under the Tax Injunction Act). Of course,
in light of the Supreme Court's capacity (perhaps responsibility) to limit the issues it reaches
in deciding cases, a capacity that exists only in an attenuated manner in the federal courts of
appeals, the availability of this practice to the courts of appeals reasonably may be open to
question.
On the other hand, in this case, where the disposition was under the Anti-Injunction Act,
the practice appears to comport with principles of judicial restraint. One of the main reasons
why our federal legal system is so concerned that federal courts satisfy themselves of their
jurisdiction before proceeding to resolution of a dispute is to ensure that parties are not bound
to a resolution of a dispute by a national forum unless that forum properly is authorized -
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discussion of the Supreme Court's general treatment of the AntiInjunction Act, Judge Garwood divided his discussion with respect
to injunctive relief into consideration of the two exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction. Act arguably applicable in this case, which permit a
federal court to grant an injunction ''to protect . . . or effectuate its
judgments" and "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." 192
The TEIA contended that the district court could issue an
injunction "to protect . . . or effectuate" the award issued . by the
administrative law judge, arguing that the award barred the statecourt suit under principles of issue and claim preclusion. 193 With
respect to issue preclusion, the court noted that none of the matters
raised by Jackson in the state-court suit -:- such as the alleged bad
faith of the TEIA and the emotional distress suffered by Jackson was raised before the administrative law judge. 194 Because applicable
Supreme Court precedent limited this exception to claims that " 'actually have been decided' " in the federal case, issue preclusion was
inapplicable. 195 The court then examined the TEIA's argument that
claim preclusion would have barred Jackson's state-court suit because
his claims were a part of the same transaction as the LHWCA
proceeding. 196 The court was unpersuaded, however, principally because of its conclusion that the administrative law judge had no
jurisdiction to pass on any of the matters asserted in the state-court
suit. 197 Instead, she had power only to consider the availability of
benefits to Jackson under the LHWCA. 198 Because Jackson could

by both the Constitution and applicable statutes - to exercise power over the case. The Fifth
Circuit, pace Judge Brown, see Jackson, 862 F.2d at 510 (Brown, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part), made no decision on any substantive issue in this case, but merely
concluded that the district court had no authority to grant the relief sought by the TEIA.
Although this technically may not be a disposition on a jurisdictional basis, the difference in
this context is of little or no significance, because the court's ruling will have no preclusive
effect on the parties; they can continue to litigate in state court unburdened by the evanescent
federal litigation.
192. The TEIA did not contend that the third exception, permitting a federal court to
issue injunctions "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," was applicable. 862 F.2d at 496
n.6.
193. See id. at 501.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 500-01 (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, _ _ , 108
S. Ct, 1684, 1690, 100 L. Ed. 2d 127, 137 (1988)).
196. Id. at 501-03.
197. Id. at 502.
198. See id.
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not raise his state-law claims before the administrative law judge, he
was not precluded from raising them in a later and separate lawsuit. 199
In sum, because neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion would
have barred Jackson's suit, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there
was no case for an injunction ''to protect . . . or effectuate'' the
judgment of the administrative law judge. 200
The court then turned to the "expressly authorized" exception. 201
The court had little difficulty in finding this exception inapplicable. 202
The text of the LHWCA does not expressly refer to the AntiInjunction Act. 203 Nor is there any legislative history indicating that
the LHWCA was directed at state judicial action. 204 Finally, there
was no indication that the rights created by the LHWCA - in
substance a right to payment of benefits - would be frustrated by
allowing the employee also to bring a state-court action in tort
against the employer's insurer. 205 Accordingly, the court concluded
that injunctive relief was not available. 206
This left the major issue in dispute: whether the Anti-Injunction
Act, which on its face bars only injunctions, also bars declaratory
relief. 207 The court first explained that the principal purpose of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act 208 was

199. Id. at 503.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 504.
203. See id. at 503.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 504.
206. Id. TEIA relied heavily on Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972), which found
that Congress "expressly authorized" the issuance of injunctions in actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, although there is no mention in § 1983 of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument, relying principally on the Supreme Court's explanation in Mitchum
that the exception requires a " 'right ... enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could
be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding.' "
862 F.2d at 503 (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 237) (emphasis of Jackson court omitted). In
substance, the Fifth Circuit's decision is a conclusion that the provisions of the LHWCA
making its remedies exclusive, LHWCA § 5(a), 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. V 1987), do not
create a right of sufficient federal importance to justify inference of an exception to the Anti•
Injunction Act. I find it hard to quarrel with this conclusion. Although Judge Brown's dissent
is not clear on this point, he appears to have agreed with this result. See 862 F.2d at 511
(Brown, J ., dissenting) ("I dissent as to the court's holding that, as in the case of an injunction,
the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits in this case the issuance of a declaratory order.") (emphasis
added).
207. 862 F.2d at 504.
208. This statute provides: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any
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to provide a means to grant litigants judicial relief from legal
uncertainty in situations that had not developed sufficiently to
authorize traditional coercive relief. Litigants would no longer be
put to the Hobson's choice of foregoing [sic] their rights or acting
at their peril; nor, if they had already acted, would they be forced
to wait, for perhaps many years, until the statute of limitations
expired, to know whether they had been subjected to some significant liability. 209

The TEIA's suit fell wholly outside this purpose, and wholly
within the purpose of the Anti-Injunction Act.
TEIA [was not] in the position of not knowing when its potential
liability would ever be judicially determined, for the state case
was moving to resolution. . . . It is plain that the only purpose
and effect of TEIA's federal suit was to defeat Jackson's state
suit against it and to, in effect, overrule the state trial court's
denial of TEIA's plea in bar. 210

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act's
literal terms should be extended to include declaratory relief:
To allow declaratory relief in these circumstances would be to
transform section 2283 from a pillar of federalism reflecting the
fundamental constitutional independence of the states and their
courts, to an anachronistic, minor technicality, easily avoided by
mere nomenclature or procedural sleight of hand ....
"[O]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely
the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions was
designed to avoid. This is true for at least two reasons. In
the first place, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that
after a declaratory judgment is issued the district court may
enforce it by granting '[f]urther necessary or proper relief,'
28 U .S.C. § 2202, and therefore a declaratory judgment
issued while state proceedings are pending might serve as the
basis for a subsequent injunction against those proceedings
to 'protect or effectuate' the declaratory judgment, 28 U .S.C.
§ 2283, and thus result in a clearly improper interference
with the state proceedings. Secondly, even if the declaratory
judgment is not used as a basis for actually issuing an

208. This statute provides: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any
court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
209. TE/A, 862 F.2d at 505.
210. Id. (emphasis in original).
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injunction, the declaratory relief alone has virtually the same
practical impact as a formal injunction would." 211

To quell any suggestion that its broad and unliteral construction
of the Anti-Injunction Act was inappropriate, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in California v. Grace Brethren Church. 212
In that case, the Court construed the Tax Injunction Act 213 to bar
not only injunctions, but also declaratory relief, explaining: "[B]ecause
there is little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory
relief, we would be hard pressed to conclude that Congress intended
to prohibit taxpayers from seeking one form of anticipatory relief
against state tax officials in federal court, while permitting them to
seek another. " 214
The analogy to Grace Brethren is not ironclad. As the Court
noted in that case, the forceful language of the Tax Injunction Act
bars jurisdiction not only to enjoin, but also to "suspend or restrain. " 215 It takes only a delicate linguistic leap to conclude that a
declaratory judgment can "suspend or restrain" a state official. The
narrower language of the Anti-Injunction Act, by contrast, prevents
only an "injunction. " 216 It is thus somewhat harder to justify using
the Anti-Injunction Act to put nontax declaratory judgments beyond
the pale. But the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, bolstered by the Supreme
Court's generally vigorous interpretation of that statute, still seems
persuasive. The Supreme Court's general interpretive posture surely
suggests that niceties of statutory verbiage must be interpreted in
light of the Court's understanding of principles of comity. For
example, the Court liberally stretched the words of the Anti-Injunction · Act in Mitchum v. Foster211 to retain the possibility that injunctive relief against state proceedings could be granted under 42 U.S. C.,
section 1983. Conversely, the jurisprudence of Younger v. Harris2 18
may be regarded as a judicially implied extension of the Anti-

211. Id. at 505-06 (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (brackets inserted
by the TE/A court)).
212. 457 U.S. 393 (1982).
213. That statute provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
214. Grace Brethren, 457 U.S. at 408 (quoted in Jackson, 862 F.2d at 507).
215. The text of the Tax Injunction Act appears supra note 213.
216. The text of the Anti-Injunction Act appears supra note 188.
217. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
218. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Injunction Act, again with no firm basis in any congressional enactment.219 In sum, the Fifth Circuit's application of the broader policies
behind the Anti-Injunction Act, rather than the strict words of the
statute, seems to accord with the Court's general approach in this
area.220
The court next rejected the panel's reliance on Steffel v. Thompson;221 In Steffel, the Supreme Court held that the principles of
Younger did not bar issuance of a declaratory judgment as to the
unconstitutionality of a statute pursuant to which a state was about
to institute criminal proceedings, even though it was not then clear
that injunctive relief was permissible. 222 The panel had concluded that
Steffel required a distinction between injunctive and declaratory
relief, applicable in this case. 223 The en bane court rejected this
conclusion, deciding instead that the reasoning of Steffel was inapplicable here. 224 The court believed that the Steffel holding that a
federal declaratory judgment could be issued when no state criminal
proceeding was yet pending rested on four premises: (i) federal
intervention would not "result in duplicative legal proceedings"; (ii)
federal intervention would not "disrupt the state criminal justice
system"; (iii) federal intervention would not "reflect negatively upon
the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles"; and (iv)
refusal "to intervene when no state proceeding is pending" would
place the plaintiff " 'between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state
law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity.' " 225 Because none of these reasons was
applicable to a case, like Jackson's, in which the state proceeding
already was pending at the initiation of the federal court suit, the

219. For an example in another context, one might consider the Court's interpretation of
statutes that arguably impose monetary liability on states. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 2397, 105 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1989). For an insightful discussion of the
Court's approach in this area, see Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1141 (1988).
220. Although Judge Brown's opinion is not entirely clear, it appears that he does not rest
his disagreement with the panel on criticism of the panel's Jess than completely literal
construction of the statute. See infra notes 227-232 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Brown's opinion).
221. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
222. It is now relatively clear that injunctive relief can issue in some circumstances similar
to Steffel. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 34, at 1426-28.
223. 820 F.2d at 1420.
224. 862 F.2d at 508.
225. Id. at 507-08 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462).
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court categorically rejected the panel's reliance on Steffel. 226
In addition to Judge Garwood's opinion for the court, Jackson
produced three separate opinions. The most analytically significant
was Judge Brown's dissent, in which Judge Williams joined. 227 Judge
Brown began by noting that the law of the Fifth Circuit clearly
established that Jackson's state-court action was preempted by the
LHWCA. 228 Judge Brown then suggested that the state-court action
was removable to federal court because the state-law causes of action
raised in the state-court suit were preempted by the LHWCA. 229
Because Judge Brown believed that the TEIA could have removed
the action to federal court and caused the federal court to grant
relief directly, he concluded that issuance of a declaratory judgment
in this case would not offend the principles of the Anti-Injunction
Act.230

As I have mentioned above, the court declined to consider the
jurisdictional question, 231 but it did respond to Judge Brown's argument by noting that the TEIA had never attempted to remove this
case:

226. Id. at 508. The court also relied for this point on Justice Brennan's scholarly and
discursive discussion of the merits and purposes of declaratory relief in his separate opinion
in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), in which Justice Brennan stated that "the most
significant factor determining the propriety of federal intervention is whether a state proceeding
exists that was initiated before the federal suit was filed." Id. at 116 (emphasis in original)
(quoted in Jackson, 862 F.2d at 508 n.23).
227. 862 F.2d at 510-13. The other two opinions were written by Judge Rubin and by
Chief Judge Clark. Judge Rubin filed a brief concurring opinion, joined by Judge Johnson,
in which he suggested that Congress should amend the Anti-Injunction Act to prevent the
injustice of allowing cases like Jackson's to proceed in state courts. Id. at 509-10. Judges
Brown and Williams joined the portion of Judge Rubin's opinion calling for revision of the
Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 511. Chief Judge Clark joined in the opinions of Judges Garwood
and Rubin, and also filed a short concurring opinion, indicating strong dissatisfaction with
the result in Jackson, but acknowledging that he felt
bound to agree that precedent compels this court to send the case to a court that,
if it acts correctly, may only dismiss .... I am at a loss to comprehend how this
procedure can advance comity. Exalting the form of the anti-injunction act over the
substance of preemption strips both comity and justice of their meaning.
Id. at 509.
228. Id. at 510-11 (citing Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 838 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.
1988)).
229. Id. at 511-12 (relying on Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)).
In light of the Supreme Court's recent treatment of this precedent, Judge Brown's conclusion
is questionable. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
230. TE/A, 862 F.2d at 512.
231. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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We decline to authorize an 'end run' around removal procedures
and jurisprudence by authorizing a party to ignore removal (and
its limitations) but nevertheless achieve the same result by filing
a federal court declaratory judgment suit with the sole object of
litigating a preemptive defense to the federal defendant's earlier
filed pending state court suit against the federal plaintiff. 232

Although this certainly is a case that demonstrates the costs of
federal-court deference to state courts, Judge Garwood's opinion is
persuasive. There can be little doubt that allowing issuance of a
declaratory judgment in this case, in the face of a previously filed
state-court action about to go to tri~l, conflicts directly with the
principles of the Anti-Injunction Act as explicated by the Supreme
Court. 233 Judge Brown's argument ignores the substantial differences
between removing a suit entirely from state court to federal court
and leaving the suit in place but issuing a declaration as to how the
state courts should proceed on the presumption that the state courts
will not faithfully apply federal law.
B.

Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District v.
Johnson & Cravens, 13911, Inc. 234

Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District filed suit
in a state court to recover delinquent ad valorem taxes. 235 The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), as the receiver
for First Savings and Loan Association of Burkburnett, Texas, held
a mortgage on the property with respect to which the taxes had been
assessed. 236 FSLIC removed the case to federal court and sought
dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
under the Hudspeth doctrine. 237 The school district opposed removal

232. 862 F.2d at 508 n.24.
233. This is not to suggest that principles of comity recognize no difference between
issuance of a declaratory judgment and issuance of an injunction. For one such difference,
see the discussion of Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 871 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989),
infra notes 274-310 and accompanying text.
234. 858 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. Oct. 1988), modified on other grounds, 867 F.2d 1517,
vacated on other grounds, 889 F.2d 571 (1989).
235. See id. at 1011.
236. See id.
237. See id.; North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that FSLIC had broad adjudicatory powers over claims against failed savings and
loan associations under the control of FSLIC), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The Supreme
Court firmly rejected the Hudspeth doctrine in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, _
U.S. _ _ , 109 S. Ct. 1361, 103 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989).
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and also argued that the Tax Injunction Act 238 barred relief. 239 The
court rejected this argument, concluding that the statutory framework
establishing the authority of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(the "FHLBB") - specifically 12 U.S.C., section 1730(k)(l), which
grants FSLIC authority to remove certain cases to federal court
''notwithstanding any other provision of law'' - creates an exception
to the Tax Injunction Act. The court explained that
FSLIC, subject to the FHLBB's review and regulation, has the
power, as a liquidation receiver, to resolve and pay all claims
against the institution. Allowing local taxing authorities to pursue
their claims in state court while requiring other creditors to utilize
the administrative process would be permitting an "end run around
the receiver's broad realm of authority. " 240

The court's interpretation of the Tax Injunction Act is disputable. First, the court's reliance on the "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" clause in section 1730(k)(l)241 is questionable.
Nothing in section 1730(k)(l) suggests that it is intended to constitute
an exception to the Tax Injunction Act. Indeed, nothing in the
section authorizes the issuance of an injuction. 242 Second, to the
extent the court was rely,ng on the broad authority granted to FSLIC
by the Hudspeth doctrine, the court's understanding of FSLIC's
authority was erroneous. As the Supreme Court explained in Coit

238. That statute provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such state." 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). For an informative
discussion, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 34, at 1339-45.
239. See Carrollton-Farmers, 858 F.2d at 1014.
240. 858 F.2d at 1015 (emphasis in original) (quoting FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391,
1394 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Zohdi v. FSLIC, _ _ U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 1633,
104 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1989)).
241. See id. at 1012.
242. It is worthy of note that the Tax Injunction Act, unlike the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), does not have an explicit exception for other acts of Congress. See 11
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 4237, at 661 (2d ed. 1988). This omission,
however, cannot be determinative. Even if Congress did not provide in the Tax Injunction
Act for exceptions provided in other statutes, all courts would recognize such an exception in
a statute including the phrase· "notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1341." It does,
however, support a greater reluctance to find that other statutes constitute exceptions to the
Tax Injunction Act. This textual distinction may illuminate the differing results reached in
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), which concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutes
an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, and in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association,
Inc. v. NcNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), in which the Court concluded that principles of comity
prohibited an injunction under § 1983 against a state tax system.
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Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 243 the scope of FSLIC authority is much narrower than the Fifth Circuit had been assuming
under the shadow of Hudspeth. Because the Supreme Court concluded in Coit that FSLIC does not currently have the power to
command the cessation of federal-court proceedings, 244 it would be
quite striking to infer - in the face of the Tax Injunction Act that FSLIC has the power to have federal courts enjoin state-court
proceedings.
On the other hand, the inability of the federal court to issue an
injunction against the state-court proceedings does not necessarily
mean that removal was improper. The Tax Injunction Act does not
explicitly prohibit removal, but merely prohibits acts that would
"enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment" of state taxes. 245 Removal, unaccompanied by any substantive action by the federal court,
does not necessarily "enjoin, suspend or restrain" the activities of
state taxing authorities. Accordingly, although the Fifth Circuit may
have been correct to conclude that the Tax Injunction Act did not
bar removal itself, it probably would bar the federal court from
accepting FSLIC's invitation to dismiss the tax collection proceedings.
C.

New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans246

Middle South Utilities, Inc. owns several electric utility companies in the Southeast, including New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
("NOPSI"), which provides electricity to consumers in New Orleans. 247 Middle South constructed a nuclear reactor known as Grand
Gulf 1.248 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"),
which has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale power rates, 249
allocated seventeen percent of the cost of Grand Gulf I to NOPSl. 250
In 1985, NOPSI sought a rate increase from the City Council of

243. _ _ U.S.--, 109 S. Ct. 1361, 103 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989) {repudiating the Hudspeth
doctrine).
244. See id. at - - , 109 S. Ct. at 1371-76, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 618-24.
245. The text of the statute is quoted supra note 238.
246. 850 F.2d 1069 {5th Cir. July 1988), rev'd, _ _ U.S. - - , 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L.
Ed. 2d 298 (1989).
247. See id. at 1071.
248. See id.
249. 16 U.S.C. § 824{b) (1988); see Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953, 956 (1986).
250. See 850 F.2d at 1072.
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New Orleans to cover the portion of the costs of Grand Gulf I that
FERC had allocated to NOPSl. 251 When the City Council refused to
grant a rate increase until it had investigated the prudence of Middle
South's decision to build Grand Gulf I, NOPSI sought an injunction
from a federal court, contending that the City's actions intruded
upon FER C's exclusive jurisdiction. 252 The district court abstained,
in a decision that eventually was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
("NOPSI l"). 253 In April 1987, the City Council completed its
hearings and began deliberations. 254 NO PSI again sought relief from
federal court and again was rebuffed, this time on the theory that
the case was not yet ripe for decision. 255
Finally, in February 1988, the City Council issued a rate order,
largely disallowing NOPSI's requested rate increase, based in substance upon a conclusion that NOPSI's activities in connection with
the Grand Gulf I investment were imprudent. 256 While a challenge to
the City's decision was pending in the state courts, NOPSI went to
federal court for a third time, seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief from the rate order. 257 The district court again abstained, 258
this time in reliance on Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 259
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying for the most part
on the law established in NOPSI I. The court noted the conclusion
of the panel in NOPSI I:
'' [T]he regulation and adjustment of local utility rates is of
paramount local concern and a matter which demands local administrative expertise .... [T]he Louisiana state courts are fully
able to address NOPSI's complaints about Council actions ....
Nor would federal abstention foreclose the United States Supreme
Court from entertaining NOPSI's preemption claim should it wind
its way up through the state courts." 260
251. See id.
252. See id. at 1073.
253. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1986)
(NOPSI I), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987).
254. See 850 F.2d at 1073.
255. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1987).
256. See 850 F.2d at 1073.
257. See id. at 1074.
258. See id.
259. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). In Burford, the Court concluded that the lower federal courts
should have abstained from deciding a claim that the Texas Railroad Commission had
misapplied a Texas regulatory system regarding allocation of oil-field drilling sites.
260. Id. at 1078 (quoting NOPSI I, 798 F.2d at 862).
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Because this analysis remained applicable, and because the panel
was bound by the decision in NOPSI I, the court concluded that
Burford abstention was proper. 261 The court also reaffirmed the
conclusion of the NOPSI I court that Younger abstention 262 was
proper ''because the Council proceedings constituted an ongoing state
judicial proceeding, involving important state interests, and in that
proceeding NOPSI had an adequate opportunity to litigate its federal
claims. " 263
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed on
both grounds. 264 Burford abstention was improper because this case
did not involve a claim that the state entity had misapplied a local
regulatory scheme as a matter of local law. 265 Instead, this case
presented a claim that the local scheme was operating in a manner
preempted by federal law. 266 As the Court explained, "Unlike a claim
that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed
to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors,
federal adjudication of this sort of pre-emption claim would not
disrupt the State's attempt to insure uniformity in the treatment of
an 'essentially local problem.' " 267
The Court concluded that Younger abstention was improper
because the City Council's rate proceedings were legislative or executive in nature, rather than judicial. 268 The Court apparently reasoned
that there is a fundamental difference between a challenge to ongoing
judicial proceedings, such as the challenges made in Younger and its
progeny, and NOPSI's challenge to the City's ratemaking decision,
which the Court characterized as a legislative act. 269 In the Court's
view, the principles behind Younger abstention required that it be
applied only when the pending state proceeding could be characterized

261. Id. at 1079-80.
262. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The literature on the subject of Younger
abstention is voluminous, but for a good introduction, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 84, § 52A.
263. 850 F.2d at 1079.
264. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 109 S.
Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989).
265. Id. at _ _ , 109 S. Ct. at 2515, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 314.
266. Id. at _ _ , 109 S. Ct. at 2514-15, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 313.
267. Id. at _ _ , 109 S. Ct. at 2515, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 313 (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)).
268. Id. at _ _ , 109 S. Ct. at 2519, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 318.
269. Id. at _ _ , 109 S. Ct. at 2520, 105 L. Ed. at 319.
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as judicial, rather than as executive or legislative. 270 Although the
Court's opinion is not entirely clear, a more effective explanation
mi~ht focus not on whether the proceedings being challenged are
judicial or legislative, but on the status of those proceedings at the
time of the case. In Younger, the plaintiff sought an injunction
against ongoing judicial. proceedings. 271 In this case, NOPSI sought
ail injunction against legislative proceedings, 272 which had been concluded; NOPSI was hot seeking an injunction against the ongoing
judicial proceedings in state court, which seems to put this case
beyond the rationale behind Younger abstention. 273
D.

Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon274

Duhon executed an oil and gas lease to Allen, as lessee. 275 Allen
subsequently assigned all of its rights under the lease to San defer Oil
& Gas, lnc. 276 When the primary term of the lease expired on January
31, 1988, a dispute arose as to continuation of the lease. 277 On
February 22, 1988, Sandefer filed an action in federal court against
Duhon, seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease continued in
effect with respect to certain disputed parcels; the sole basis for
federal jurisdiction was diversity. 278 On April 14, 1988, Duhon filed
an action in a Louisiana state court against San defer and Allen (who

270. Id. at - - , 109 S. Ct. at 2520, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 320. There is some tension between
this conclusion and the Court's statement in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), that the
Younger principles "have applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial
branch of the state government, but against those in charge of an executive branch of an
agency of state or local governments." 423 U.S. at 380. Although this suggestion has not
favorably been received by most commentators, see, e.g., Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J.
1103, 1159 (1977); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1219-27
(1977), it was cited favorably in an opinion joined by each member of the Court earlier in
the spring of 1989. See Canton v. Harris, _ _ U.S. _ _ , - - , 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1206, 103
L. Ed. 2d 412, 428 (1989).
271. 401 U.S. at 39.
272. 850 F.2d at 1073.
273. For purposes of this essay, which is to appear in a symposium discussing the work
of the Fifth Circuit during the past year, it has seemed sufficient simply to summarize· the
result reached by the Supreme Court, without offering any detailed evaluation of its reasoning.
I am discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in this case in more detail in a work in progress
regarding the development of the Younger doctrine.
274. 871 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. Apr. 1989).
275. See id. at 526-27.
276. See id. at 527.
277. See id.
278. See id.
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was not a party to the federal suit) seeking partial cancellation of
the lease. 279 Duhon then sought dismissal of the federal suit, contending that the district court should exercise its discretion not to
hear the suit. 280 The district court agreed and dismissed the federal
court suit. 281 Relying on Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 282 the
court reasoned that "where a contemporaneous state proceeding will
resolve expeditiously all issues in controversy, a federal district court
should defer to the state court proceeding by declining to exercise
jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. " 283
On appeal, Sandefer contended that the district court erred by
dismissing the case without finding any exceptional circumstances in
which an important interest would be served by dismissal, 284 as
required by the Supreme Court's opinion in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States. 285 The Fifth Circuit noted that
it perceived a continuing dispute as to whether the Colorado River
factors must be present for a district court to decline to proceed
under Brillhart. 286 A Fifth Circuit panel in Mission Insurance Co. v.
Puritan Fashions Corp. 287 had concluded that such cases largely are
within the discretion of the district court because ''the purely remedial
and equitable nature of declaratory judgments vests the court with
discretion, and sets declaratory judgments outside the scope of [Colorado River abstention principles]." 288 On the other hand, a second
Fifth Circuit panel in Evanston Insurance Co. v. Jimco, Inc. 289 had
concluded that application of the Colorado River factors was required, and that it was not "within the district court's discretion to
dismiss a declaratory judgment action on the ground that the state

279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. 316 U.S. 491 (1942). In Brillhart, the Court concluded that a federal court may refuse
to entertain a declaratory judgment action if a state action is already pending in which all
issues effectively can be determined.
283. 871 F.2d at 527 (quoting the district court's opinion).
284. See id.
285. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In Colorado River the Court set forth standards for lower courts
to use in determining whether to abstain from issuing injunctive relief in the face of parallel
state court proceedings. Id. at 813-17. For a general discussion, see HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 34, at 1446-54.
286. Duhon, 871 F.2d at 528.
287. 706 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1983).
288. Id. at 601 n.l (quoted in Duhon, 871 F.2d at 528).
289. 844 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1988).
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courts could fully adjudicate all the matters in controversy between
the parties in the action already filed in those courts. " 290
After noting the apparent confusion, the court disposed of this
case by concluding, without even considering the Colorado River
factors, that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion. 291
First, it noted that the federal-court action was filed significantly
earlier than the state-court action. 292 Second, it indicated that the
earlier problems involving differing parties had been resolved. 293
Although Allen originally was a party only in the state-court action,
he subsequently had been dismissed, so that each action· involved the
same parties. 294 Third, the court noted that
the Louisiana state court is in no significantly better position to
decide this case either procedurally or substantively [than the
federal court]. . . . The case involves a straightforward question
of contractual construction which is not likely to have an impact
beyond the facts of this particular controversy, and there is no
evidence available in state court that is not available to the parties
in federal court. 295

Finally, the court noted that there was no substantial forum shopping
or geographical concern because the federal and state courthouses
were only twenty miles apart. 296
The court's analysis of the district court's exercise of its discretion reflects a sensitive consideration of the factors that a district
court should consider in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction
to issue a declaratory judgment. The court is somewhat disingenuous,
however, in claiming not to resolve the conflict it saw between the
Brillhart rule and the Colorado River factors. There seems to be
little difference between the Colorado River factors and the factors
the court analyzed in concluding that the district court abused its
discretion. 297 Conversely, a strict application of the Brillhart rule, as

290. Id. at. I 192 (quoted in Duhon, 871 F.2d at 528).
291. Duhon, 871 F.2d at 528.
292. Id. at 528-29.
293. Id. at 529.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 529. The court also noted parenthetically that, with Allen's dismissal, the statecourt action had become susceptible to removal to the federal courts. Id.
296. Id.
297. Colorado River discussed four factors that a district court should consider in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction: (i) assumption by the federal court of jurisdiction over
particular property; (ii) convenience of the forum; (iii) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; and
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the Duhon court understood it to vest unqualified discretion in the
district court, would require acceptance of the district court's decision
solely on the basis of the existing parallel state-court action in which
the dispute could have been resolved.
The real source of this problem is an exaggerated reading of
both Brillhart and Colorado River. The Duhon court seems to have
understood the Brillhart case to have gone so far as to grant a
district court unstructured discretion to refuse to decide any declaratory judgment action if a related proceeding is pending in state
court in which all issues can be resolved. 298 But Brillhart cannot bear
such a mechanical reading. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Brillhart
explained that it did not "attempt a comprehensive enumeration of
what in other cases may be revealed as relevant factors governing
the exercise of a district court's discretion. " 299 Instead, it was enough
for the Court to remand the case to the district court to require it
to consider whether the state-court suit provided an adequate forum
for litigating all of the issues in dispute. 300
Moreover, nothing in Mission Insurance Co. v. Puritan Fashion
Corp., 301 the case cited by Duhon for its broad reading of Brillhart,
justifies the idea that a district court considering whether to grant
declaratory relief in the face of a pending state proceeding should
consider no factors other than whether the issues can be resolved in
state court. Although Mission contains language that can be read to
suggest this principle, 302 it is important to note that the Mission court,

(iv) the order in which the two courts obtain jurisdiction. 424 U.S. at 818-19; see Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983). The Duhon court's
rejection of the district court's determination to abstain rested on its analysis of the second,
third, and fourth of these factors. First, the court noted that "there is no real forum-shopping
concern here, or geographical inconvenience to the parties in having the dispute tried in the
federal forum." 871 F.2d at 529. The court also concluded that it was inaccurate to suggest
"that only the state court action will be able to settle all disputes between all interested
parties." Id. Finally, the court noted that the federal-court action was commenced substantially
before the state-court action. Id. at 528-29.
298. See Duhon, 871 F.2d at 528-29.
299. 316 U.S. at 495.
300. See id. at 495-96.
301. 706 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1983).
302. Most prominently, the court stated that "the purely remedial and equitable nature of
declaratory judgments vests the court with discretion and sets declaratory judgments outside
the scope of [Colorado River abstention principles)." Id. at 601 n.l. The confusion perceived
by the Duhon court for the most part seems to have been caused by this statement, which the
Duhon court interpreted to mean that the district court has unstructured discretion not to
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notwithstanding its statement that Colorado River did not apply,
determined to uphold the district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction only after analysis of factors similar to the Colorado River
factors. For example, the court noted that the federal-court suit could
not completely resolve all of the issues in dispute and that Mission
had managed to have the federal-court action filed sooner only by
deception. 303
On the other hand, nothing in Colorado River suggests that a
federal district judge should refrain from taking into account the
peculiar aspects of declaratory judgments in determining whether it
is appropriate to proceed with adjudication. Fairly read, Colorado
River is nothing more than a partial explication of the relevant
factors governing the exercise of a district court's discretion. In no
way does this reject that portion of Brillhart's analysis that rested
on other factors, vid. the peculiar nature of declaratory relief. 304 Nor
does Jimco, the case cited by Duhon for the idea that Colorado
River rejected Brillhart, provide any support for this theory. Although
that court did consider the Colorado River factors explicitly, nothing
in its opinion suggested that it was rejecting Brillhart's holding that
the analysis for declaratory judgments differs from that for injunctions. 305
In sum, a reasoned analysis would be for the federal court to
consider both the special nature of declaratory relief and the Colorado
River factors in determining the propriety of declaratory relief. In
this case, the Fifth Circuit's application of this analysis seems well-

proceed in declaratory judgment cases, and that Colorado River principles are irrelevant in
such cases. 871 F.2d at 528. This reading, of course, does put Mission in conflict with Jimco,
which explicitly applied the Colorado River factors. But I read Mission to suggest only that
the remediable and equitable nature of a declaratory judgment entitles the district court to
discretion not to proceed, even if Colorado River principles suggest that it should proceed.
This reading, which largely dissipates the perceived conflict, is bolstered by the Mission court's
application of its rule, which, as I mention in the text, involves consideration of factors closely
analogous to those discussed in Colorado River. Cf. JOA C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2758 (2d ed. 1983) (suggesting that a court "in the
exercise of the discretion that it always has in determining whether to give a declaratory
judgment, properly may refuse declaratory relief if [an) alternative remedy is better or more
effective").
303. See 706 F.2d at 602-03.
304. 316 U.S. at 495; see also Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811
F.2d 1249, 1254 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Sneed, J.) (concluding that the Supreme Court
decisions following Colorado River have not undermined Brillhart).
305. See 844 F.2d at I 192-93.
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considered. The district court's decision rested on the simplistic notion
that the mere pendency of the subsequently filed state action was
sufficient to justify cessation of federal jurisdiction, even though (at
least from the Fifth Circuit's perspective) it seemed apparent that
resolution of the case in state court was not likely to serve the parties
better in any material respect than resolution in federal court. 306 The
Fifth Circuit rejected this narrow perspective and considered not only
the circumstance that a state proceeding was pending by the time the
district court reached judgment, but also factors similar to those
elucidated in Colorado River.
Most importantly, the court gave weight to the peculiar nature
of declaratory relief. At the time the action was initiated, it presented
a classic case of the need for declaratory relief. San defer was in
doubt as to whether the oil and gas lease was continuing in full force
and effect. 307 Absent a declaratory judgment, Sandefer's choices were
to proceed with drilling as if the lease were in effect and risk an
action for trespass, or refrain from exercising its rights under the
lease, even though it might be in effect. 308 In such a case, where
declaratory relief seems to have been appropriate at the time the
action was commenced, the institution of a subsequent state-court
proceeding should not be sufficient to remove the case from the
jurisdiction of the federal district court. 309
Finally, it is important to remember that declaratory relief
generally has been considered less intrusive on parallel state-court
proceedings than injunctive relief. 310 It would stand this concept on
its head to conclude that, although Colorado River requires federal
courts to proceed with cases seeking injunctive relief, Brillhart authorizes district courts rigidly to refrain from exercising federal
jurisdiction over identical cases seeking declaratory relief, without

306. 871 F.2d at 529. In Brillhart, by contrast, deference to the state court was based on
the district court's conclusion that state litigation would resolve the dispute in a more timely
manner. See 316 U.S. at 494 n.l.
307. See Duhon, 871 F.2d at 527.
308. See id.
309. Of course, the circumstance that a state-court proceeding is instituted after the federalcourt proceeding does not necessarily imply that the federal-court proceeding should continue.
"This is a factor that may be considered but the discretion of the federal court cannot turn
on so mechanical a rule." JOA C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & H. KANE, supra note 302, § 2758,
at 637.
310. The locus classicus for this idea is Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-16 (1971).
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any consideration of the factors of convenience discussed in Colorado

River.
V.

CONCLUSION

All too often we tend to assume that all of the important work
in interpreting federal laws is done by the Supreme Court, and that
the circuit courts do nothing more than mechanically apply the
principles articulated by the Supreme Court. This essay regarding the
Fifth Circuit's cases on federal jurisdiction during the past year
should help to show how untrue this is. During this single year, in
this small area of law, the Fifth Circuit was presented with quite a
number of interesting and difficult cases. Although I do not agree
with everything the court has done, this essay should demonstrate
that the Fifth Circuit has done a creditable job of evaluating these
cases.

